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Abstract
In this paper, a multiple antenna wire-tap channel in the presence of a multi-antenna cooperative
jammer is studied. In particular, the secure degrees of freedom (s.d.o.f.) of this channel is established,
with Nt antennas at the transmitter, Nr antennas at the legitimate receiver, and Ne antennas at the
eavesdropper, for all possible values of the number of antennas, Nc, at the cooperative jammer. In
establishing the result, several different ranges of Nc need to be considered separately. The lower
and upper bounds for these ranges of Nc are derived, and are shown to be tight. The achievability
techniques developed rely on a variety of signaling, beamforming, and alignment techniques which
vary according to the (relative) number of antennas at each terminal and whether the s.d.o.f. is integer
valued. Specifically, it is shown that, whenever the s.d.o.f. is integer valued, Gaussian signaling for both
transmission and cooperative jamming, linear precoding at the transmitter and the cooperative jammer,
and linear processing at the legitimate receiver, are sufficient for achieving the s.d.o.f. of the channel. By
contrast, when the s.d.o.f. is not an integer, the achievable schemes need to rely on structured signaling
at the transmitter and the cooperative jammer, and joint signal space and signal scale alignment. The
converse is established by combining an upper bound which allows for full cooperation between the
transmitter and the cooperative jammer, with another upper bound which exploits the secrecy and
reliability constraints.
This paper was presented in part at the 2014 IEEE Information Theory Workshop, and the 2015 IEEE International Conference
on Communications. This work was supported by NSF Grants CCF 09-64362, 13-19338 and CNS 13-14719.
2I. INTRODUCTION
Information theoretically secure message transmission in noisy communication channels was
first considered in the seminal work by Wyner [1]. Reference [2] subsequently identified the
secrecy capacity of a general discrete memoryless wire-tap channel. Reference [3] studied the
Gaussian wire-tap channel and its secrecy capacity. More recently, an extensive body of work was
devoted to study a variety of network information theoretic models under secrecy constraint(s),
see for example [4]–[21]. The secrecy capacity region for most of multi-terminal models remain
open despite significant progress on bounds and associated insights. Recent work thus includes
efforts that concentrate on characterizing the more tractable high signal-to-noise ratio (SNR)
scaling behavior of secrecy capacity region for Gaussian multi-terminal models [19]–[24].
Among the multi-transmitter models studied, a recurrent theme in achievability is enlisting one
or more terminals to transmit intentional interference with the specific goal of diminishing the
reception capability of the eavesdropper, known as cooperative jamming [25]. For the Gaussian
wire-tap channel, adding a cooperative jammer terminal transmitting Gaussian noise can improve
the secrecy rate considerably [9], albeit not the scaling of the secrecy capacity with power at
high SNR. Recently, reference [21] has shown that, for the Gaussian wire-tap channel, adding
a cooperative jammer and utilizing structured codes for message transmission and cooperative
jamming, provide an achievable secrecy rate scalable with power, i.e., a positive secure degrees
of freedom (s.d.o.f.), an improvement from the zero degrees of freedom of the Gaussian wire-tap
channel. More recently, reference [22] has proved that, for this channel, the s.d.o.f. 1
2
, achievable
by codebooks constructed from integer lattices along with real interference alignment, is tight.
References [23], [24] have subsequently identified the s.d.o.f. region for multi-terminal Gaussian
wire-tap channel models.
While the above development is for single-antenna terminals, multiple antennas have also
been utilized to improve secrecy rates and s.d.o.f. for several channel models, see for example
[5]–[7], [19], [26]–[31]. The secrecy capacity of the multi-antenna (MIMO) wire-tap channel,
identified in [26] scales with power only when the legitimate transmitter has an advantage over
the eavesdropper in the number of antennas. It then follows naturally to utilize a cooperative
jamming terminal to improve the secrecy rate and scaling for multi-antenna wire-tap channels
as well which is the focus of this work.
3In this paper, we study the multi-antenna wire-tap channel with a multi-antenna cooperative
jammer. We characterize the high SNR scaling of the secrecy capacity, i.e., the s.d.o.f., of the
channel with Nc antennas at the cooperative jammer, Nt antennas at transmitter, Nr antennas
at the receiver, and Ne antennas at the eavesdropper. The achievability and converse techniques
both are methodologically developed for ranges of the parameters, i.e., the number of antennas
at each terminal. The upper and lower bounds for all parameter values are shown to match one
another. The s.d.o.f. results in this paper match the achievability results derived in [32], [33],
which are special cases for {Nt = Nr = 1, Nc = Ne}, {Nt = Nr = Ne = N,Nc = 2N},
{Nt = Nr = Ne = N,Nc = 2N − 1}, and real channel gains. The s.d.o.f. for the cases
{Nt = Nr = Ne} and {Nt = Nr}, for all possible values of Nc, were reported in [34], [35],
respectively.
The proposed achievable schemes for different ranges of the values for Nc, Nt, Nr, and Ne all
involve linear precoding and linear receiver processing. The common goal to all these schemes
is to perfectly align the cooperative jamming signals over the information signals observed at
the eavesdropper while simultaneously enabling information and cooperative jamming signal
separation at the legitimate receiver. We show that whenever the s.d.o.f. of the channel is integer
valued, Gaussian signaling both at the transmitter and the cooperative jammer suffices to achieve
the s.d.o.f. By contrast, non-integer s.d.o.f. requires structured signaling along with joint signal
space and signal scale alignment in the complex plane [36], [37]. The necessity of structured
signaling follows from the fact that fractional s.d.o.f. indicates sharing at least one spatial
dimension between information and cooperative jamming signals at the receiver’s signal space.
In this case, sharing the same spatial dimension between Gaussian information and jamming
signals, which have similar power scaling, does not provide positive degrees of freedom, and we
need for structured signals that can be separated over this single dimension at high SNR. The
tools that enable the signal scale alignment are available in the field of transcendental number
theory [37]–[39], which we utilize.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the channel model, and Section III
provides the main results. For clarity of exposition, we first present the converse and achievability
for the MIMO wire-tap channel with Nt = Nr = N in Sections IV and V. Section VI then
extends the converse and achievability proofs for the case Nt 6= Nr. Section VII discusses the
4results of this work and Section VIII concludes the paper.
Overall, this study determines the value in jointly utilizing signal scale and spatial interference
alignment techniques for secrecy and quantifies the impact of a multi-antenna helper for the
MIMO wire-tap channel by settling the question of the secrecy prelog for the (Nt × Nr ×Ne)
MIMO wire-tap channel in the presence of an Nc-antenna cooperative jammer, for all possible
values of Nc. In contrast with the single antenna case, where integer lattice codes and real
interference alignment suffice to achieve the s.d.o.f. of the channel, in the MIMO setting, one
needs to utilize a variety of signaling, beam-forming, and alignment techniques, in order to
coordinate the transmitted and received signals for different values of Nt, Nr, Ne, and Nc.
II. CHANNEL MODEL AND DEFINITIONS
First, we remark the notation we use throughout the paper: Small letters denote scalars and
capital letters denote random variables. Vectors are denoted by bold small letters, while matrices
and random vectors are denoted by bold capital letters1. Sets are denoted using calligraphic
fonts. All logarithms are taken to be base 2. The set of integers {−Q, · · · , Q} is denoted by
(−Q,Q)Z. 0m×n denotes an m × n matrix of zeros, and In denotes an n × n identity matrix.
For matrix A, N(A) denotes its null space, det(A) denotes its determinant, and ||A|| denotes
its induced norm. For vector V, ||V|| denotes its Euclidean norm, and Vji denotes the ith to
jth components in V. We use Vn to denote the n-letter extension of the random vector V, i.e.,
Vn = [V(1) · · ·V(n)]. The operators T , H , and † denote the transpose, Hermitian, and pseudo
inverse operations. We use R,C, Q, and Z, to denote the sets of real, complex, rational, and
integer numbers, respectively. Z[j] denotes the set of Gaussian (complex) integers. A circularly
symmetric Gaussian random vector with zero mean and covariance matrix K is denoted by
CN(0,K).
As the channel model, we consider the MIMO wire-tap channel with an Nt-antenna trans-
mitter, Nr-antenna receiver, Ne-antenna eavesdropper, and an Nc-antenna cooperative jammer
as depicted in Fig. 1. The received signals at the receiver and eavesdropper, at the nth channel
1The distinction between matrices and random vectors is clear from the context.
5Fig. 1: (Nt×Nr×Ne) multiple antenna wire-tap channel with an Nc-antenna cooperative jammer.
use, are given by
Yr(n) = HtXt(n) +HcXc(n) + Zr(n) (1)
Ye(n) = GtXt(n) +GcXc(n) + Ze(n), (2)
where Xt(n) and Xc(n) are the transmitted signals from the transmitter and the cooperative
jammer at the nth channel use. Ht ∈ CNr×Nt , Hc ∈ CNr×Nc are the channel gain matrices from
the transmitter and the cooperative jammer to the receiver, while Gt ∈ CNe×Nt , Gc ∈ CNe×Nc are
the channel gain matrices from the transmitter and the cooperative jammer to the eavesdropper.
It is assumed that the channel gains are static, independently drawn from a complex-valued
continuous distribution, and known at all terminals. Zr(n) and Ze(n) are the complex Gaussian
noise at the receiver and eavesdropper at the nth channel use, where Zr(n) ∼ CN(0, INr) and
Ze(n) ∼ CN(0, INe) for all n. Zr(n) is independent from Ze(n) and both are independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) across the time index2 n. The power constraints on the transmitted
signals at the transmitter and the cooperative jammer are E{XHt Xt} ,E{XHc Xc} ≤ P .
The transmitter aims to send a message W to the receiver, and keep it secret from the external
eavesdropper. A stochastic encoder, which maps the message W to the transmitted signal Xnt ∈
Xnt , is used at the transmitter. The receiver uses its observation, Ynr ∈ Ynr , to obtain an estimate
Wˆ of the transmitted message. Secrecy rate Rs is achievable if for any ǫ > 0, there is a channel
2Throughout the paper, we omit the index n whenever possible.
6code (2nRs, n) satisfying3
Pe = Pr
{
Wˆ 6= W
}
≤ ǫ, (3)
1
n
H(W |Yne ) ≥
1
n
H(W )− ǫ. (4)
The secrecy capacity of a channel, Cs, is defined as the closure of all its achievable secrecy
rates. For a channel with complex-valued coefficients, the achievable secure degrees of freedom
(s.d.o.f.), for a given secrecy rate Rs, is defined as
Ds = lim
P→∞
Rs
logP
. (5)
The cooperative jammer transmits the signal Xnc ∈ Xnc in order to reduce the reception capa-
bility of the eavesdropper. However, this transmission affects the receiver as well, as interference.
The jamming signal, Xnc , does not carry any information. Additionally, there is no shared secret
between the transmitter and the cooperative jammer.
III. MAIN RESULT
We first state the s.d.o.f. results for Nt = Nr = N .
Theorem 1 The s.d.o.f. of the MIMO wire-tap channel with an Nc-antenna cooperative jammer,
N antennas at each of the transmitter and receiver, and Ne antennas at the eavesdropper is
given by
Ds =

[N +Nc −Ne]+, for 0 ≤ Nc ≤ Ne − min{N,Ne}2
N − min{N,Ne}
2
, for Ne − min{N,Ne}2 < Nc ≤ max{N,Ne}
N+Nc−Ne
2
, for max{N,Ne} < Nc ≤ N +Ne.
(6)
Proof: The proof for Theorem 1 is provided in Sections IV and V. 
Next, in Theorem 2 below, we generalize the result in Theorem 1 to Nt 6= Nr.
3We consider weak secrecy throughout this paper.
7Theorem 2 The s.d.o.f. of the MIMO wire-tap channel with an Nc-antenna cooperative jammer,
Nt-antenna transmitter, Nr-antenna receiver, and Ne-antenna eavesdropper is given by
Ds =

min {Nr, [Nc +Nt −Ne]+} , for 0 ≤ Nc ≤ N1
min
{
Nt, Nr,
Nr+[Nt−Ne]+
2
}
, for N1 < Nc ≤ N2
min
{
Nt, Nr,
Nc+Nt−Ne
2
}
, for N2 < Nc ≤ N3,
(7)
where,
N1 = min
{
Ne,
[
Nr
2
+
Ne −Nt
2− 1Ne>Nt
]+}
, 1Ne>Nt =

1, if Ne > Nt
0, if Ne ≤ Nt
N2 = Nr + [Ne −Nt]+ , N3 = max {N2, 2min {Nt, Nr}+Ne −Nt} .
Proof: The proof for Theorem 2 is provided in Section VI. 
Remark 1 Theorem 2 provides a complete characterization for the s.d.o.f. of the channel. The
s.d.o.f. at Nc = N3 is equal to min{Nt, Nr}, which is equal to the d.o.f of the (Nt×Nr) point-
to-point MIMO Gaussian channel. Thus, increasing the number of antenna at the cooperative
jammer, Nc, over N3 can not increase the s.d.o.f. over min{Nt, Nr}.
Remark 2 For Nt ≥ Nr +Ne, the s.d.o.f. of the channel is equal to Nr at Nc = 0, i.e., the
maximum s.d.o.f. of the channel is achieved without the help of the cooperative jammer.
Remark 3 The converse proof for Theorem 2 involves combining two upper bounds for
the s.d.o.f. derived for two different ranges of Nc. These two bounds are a straight forward
generalization of those derived for the symmetric case in Theorem 1. However, combining them
is more tedious since more cases of the number of antennas at the different terminals should
be handled carefully. Achievability for Theorem 2 utilizes similar techniques to those used for
Theorem 1 as well, where handling more cases is required. For clarity of exposition, we derive
the s.d.o.f. for the symmetric case first in order to present the main ideas, and then utilize these
ideas and generalize the result to the asymmetric case of Theorem 2.
For illustration purposes, the s.d.o.f. for Nt = Nr = Ne = N , and Nc varies from 0 to 2N , is
depicted in Fig. 2. We provide the discussion of the results of this work in Section VII.
8Fig. 2: Secure degrees of freedom for a MIMO wire-tap channel, with N antennas at each of
its nodes, and a cooperative jammer with Nc antennas, where Nc varies from 0 to 2N .
IV. CONVERSE FOR Nt = Nr = N
In Section IV-A, we derive the upper bound for the s.d.o.f. for 0 ≤ Nc ≤ Ne. In Section IV-B,
we derive the upper bound for max{N,Ne} ≤ Nc ≤ N +Ne. The two bounds are combined in
Section IV-C to provide the desired upper bound in (6).
A. 0 ≤ Nc ≤ Ne
Allow for full cooperation between the transmitter and the cooperative jammer. This co-
operation can not decrease the s.d.o.f. of the channel, and yields a MIMO wire-tap channel
with N +Nc-antenna transmitter, N-antenna receiver, and Ne-antenna eavesdropper. It has been
shown in [26] that, at high SNR, i.e., P → ∞, the secrecy capacity of this channel, Cs, takes
the asymptotic form
Cs(P ) = log det
(
IN +
P
p
HG♯HH
)
+ o(logP ), (8)
where lim
P→∞
o(logP )
logP
= 0, H ∈ CN×(N+Nc) and G ∈ CNe×(N+Nc) are the channel gains from the
combined transmitter to the receiver and eavesdropper, and G♯ is the projection matrix onto the
null space of G, N(G). p = dim
{
N(H)⊥ ∩N(G)}, where N(H)⊥ is the space orthogonal to
the null space of H. Due to the randomly generated channel gains, if a vector x ∈ N(G), then
x ∈ N(H)⊥ almost surely (a.s.), for all 0 ≤ Nc ≤ Ne. Thus, p = dim(N(G)) = [N+Nc−Ne]+.
9HG♯HH can be decomposed as
HG♯HH = Ψ
0(N−p)×(N−p) 0(N−p)×p
0p×(N−p) Ω
ΨH , (9)
where Ψ ∈ CN×N is a unitary matrix and Ω ∈ Cp×p is a non-singular matrix [26]. Let Ψ =
[Ψ1 Ψ2], where Ψ1 ∈ CN×(N−p) and Ψ2 ∈ CN×p. Substituting (9) in (8) yields
Cs(P ) = log det
(
IN +
P
p
Ψ2ΩΨ
H
2
)
+ o(logP ) (10)
= log det
(
Ip +
P
p
ΩΨH2 Ψ2
)
+ o(logP ) (11)
= logP pdet
(
1
P
Ip +
1
p
Ω
)
+ o(logP ) (12)
= p logP + o(logP ), (13)
where (11) follows from Sylvester’s determinant identity and (12) follows from Ψ being unitary.
The achievable secrecy rate of the original channel, Rs, is upper bounded by Cs(P ). Thus,
the s.d.o.f. of the original channel, for 0 ≤ Nc ≤ Ne, is upper bounded as
Ds = lim
P→∞
Rs
logP
≤ lim
P→∞
p logP + o(logP )
logP
(14)
= [N +Nc −Ne]+. (15)
B. max{N,Ne} < Nc ≤ N +Ne
The upper bound we derive here is inspired by the converse of the single antenna Gaussian
wire-tap channel with a single antenna cooperative jammer derived in [22], though as we will
see shortly, the vector channel extension resulting from multiple antennas does require care. Let
φi, for i = 1, 2, · · · , 10, denote constants which do not depend on the power P .
The secrecy rate Rs can be upper bounded as follows
nRs = H(W ) (16)
= H(W )−H(W |Yne ) +H(W |Yne )−H(W |Ynr ) +H(W |Ynr ) (17)
≤ nǫ+H(W |Yne )−H(W |Ynr ,Yne ) + nδ (18)
= I(W ;Ynr |Yne ) + nφ1 (19)
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= h(Ynr |Yne )− h(Ynr |W,Yne ) + nφ1 (20)
≤ h(Ynr |Yne )− h(Ynr |W,Yne ,Xnt ,Xnc ) + nφ1 (21)
= h(Ynr ,Y
n
e )− h(Yne )− h(Znr ) + nφ1, (22)
where (18) follows since H(W )−H(W |Yne ) ≤ nǫ by the secrecy constraint in (4), H(W |Ynr ) ≤
nδ by Fano’s inequality, and H(W |Ynr ) ≥ H(W |Ynr ,Yne ) by the fact that conditioning does not
increase entropy, (22) follows since Znr is independent from {W,Yne ,Xnt ,Xnc }, and φ1 = ǫ+ δ.
Let X˜t = Xt+ Z˜t and X˜c = Xc+ Z˜c, where Z˜t ∼ CN(0,Kt) and Z˜c ∼ CN(0,Kc). Note that
X˜t and X˜c are noisy versions of the transmitted signalsXt andXc, respectively. Z˜t is independent
from Z˜c and both are independent from {Xt,Xc,Zr,Ze}. Z˜nt and Z˜nc are i.i.d. sequences of the
random vectors Z˜t and Z˜c. In addition, let Z˜1 = −HtZ˜t−HcZ˜c+Zr and Z˜2 = −GtZ˜t−GcZ˜c+
Ze. Note that Z˜1 ∼ CN(0,ΣZ˜1) and Z˜2 ∼ CN(0,ΣZ˜2), where ΣZ˜1 = HtKtHHt +HcKcHHc +IN
and Σ
Z˜2
= GtKtG
H
t +GcKcG
H
c + INe . Z˜
n
1 and Z˜n2 are i.i.d. sequences of Z˜1 and Z˜2, since
each of Znr ,Zne , Z˜nt , Z˜nc is i.i.d. across time. The covariance matrices, Kt and Kc, are chosen as
Kt = ρ
2IN and Kc = ρ2INc, where 0 < ρ ≤ 1/max
{
||HHc ||,
√
||GHt ||2 + ||GHc ||2
}
. This choice
of Kt and Kc guarantees the finiteness h(Z˜t), h(Z˜c), h(Z˜1), and h(Z˜2) as shown in Appendix
A. Starting from (22), we have
nRs ≤ h(Ynr ,Yne )− h(Yne ) + nφ2 (23)
= h(Ynr ,Y
n
e , X˜
n
t , X˜
n
c )− h(X˜nt , X˜nc |Ynr ,Yne )− h(Yne ) + nφ2 (24)
≤ h(X˜nt , X˜nc ) + h(Ynr ,Yne |X˜nt , X˜nc )− h(X˜nt , X˜nc |Ynr ,Yne ,Xnt ,Xnc )− h(Yne ) + nφ2 (25)
≤ h(X˜nt ) + h(X˜nc ) + h(Ynr |X˜nt , X˜nc ) + h(Yne |X˜nt , X˜nc )− h(Z˜nt , Z˜nc )− h(Yne ) + nφ2 (26)
= h(X˜nt ) + h(X˜
n
c ) + h(Z˜
n
1 |X˜nt , X˜nc ) + h(Z˜n2 |X˜nt , X˜nc )− h(Yne ) + nφ3 (27)
≤ h(X˜nt ) + h(X˜nc ) + h(Z˜n1 ) + h(Z˜n2 )− h(Yne ) + nφ3 (28)
= h(X˜nt ) + h(X˜
n
c )− h(Yne ) + nφ4, (29)
where (26) follows since Z˜nt and Z˜nc are independent from {Xnt ,Xnc ,Ynr ,Yne }, φ2 = φ1−h(Zr),
φ3 = φ2 − h(Z˜t) − h(Z˜c), and φ4 = φ3 + h(Z˜1) + h(Z˜2). We now consider the following two
cases.
Case 1: Ne ≤ N
11
We first lower bound h(Yne ) in (29) as follows. Using the infinite divisibility of Gaussian
distribution, we can express a stochastically equivalent form of Ze, denoted by Z′e, as
Z′e = GtZ˜t + Z˜e. (30)
where4 Z˜e ∼ CN(0, INe −GtKtGHt ) is independent from {Z˜t, Z˜c,Xt,Xc,Zr}. Z˜ne is an i.i.d.
sequence of the random vectors Z˜e. Using (30), a stochastically equivalent form of Yne is
Y′e
n
= GtX˜
n
t +GcX
n
c + Z˜
n
e . (31)
Let Xt = [Xt,1 · · ·Xt,N ]T , Z˜t = [Z˜t,1 · · · Z˜t,N ]T , and X˜t = [X˜Tt1 X˜Tt2 ]T , where X˜t1 =
[X˜t,1 · · · X˜t,Ne ]T , X˜t2 = [X˜t,Ne+1 · · · X˜t,N ]T , and X˜t,k = Xt,k+Z˜t,k, k = 1, 2, · · · , N . In addition,
let Gt = [Gt1 Gt2 ], where Gt1 ∈ CNe×Ne and Gt2 ∈ CNe×(N−Ne). Using (31), we have
h(Yne ) = h(Y
′
e
n
) = h(GtX˜
n
t +GcX
n
c + Z˜
n
e ) (32)
≥ h(GtX˜nt ) = h(Gt1X˜nt1 +Gt2X˜nt2) (33)
≥ h(Gt1X˜nt1 +Gt2X˜nt2 |X˜nt2) = h(Gt1X˜nt1 |X˜nt2) (34)
= h(X˜nt1 |X˜nt2) + n log | det(Gt1)|. (35)
where the inequality in (33) follows since {GtX˜nt } and {GcXnc + Z˜ne } are independent, as for
two independent random vectors X and Y, we have h(X+Y) ≥ h(X).
Substituting (35) in (29) results in
nRs ≤ h(X˜nt1 , X˜nt2) + h(X˜nc )− h(X˜nt1 |X˜nt2)− n log | det(Gt1)|+ nφ4 (36)
= h(X˜nt2) + h(X˜
n
c ) + nφ5, (37)
where φ5 = φ4 − log | det(Gt1)|.
We now exploit the reliability constraint in (3) to derive another upper bound for Rs, which
we combine with the bound in (37) in order to obtain the desired bound for the s.d.o.f. when
Ne < N and N ≤ Nc ≤ N +Ne. The reliability constraint in (3) can be achieved only if [40]
nRs ≤ I(Xnt ;Ynr ) = h(Ynr )− h(Ynr |Xnt ) (38)
4The choice of Kt guarantees that INe −GtKtGHt is a valid covariance matrix.
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= h(Ynr )− h(HcXnc + Znr ). (39)
Similar to (30), a stochastically equivalent form of Zr is given by
Z′r = HcZ˜c + Z˜r, (40)
where5 Z˜r ∼ CN(0, IN − HcKcHHc ) is independent from {Z˜t, Z˜c,Xt,Xc,Ze}. Z˜nr is an i.i.d.
sequence of the random vectors Z˜r.
Let Xc = [Xc,1 · · ·Xc,Nc]T , Z˜c = [Z˜c,1 · · · Z˜c,Nc]T , and X˜c = [X˜Tc1 X˜Tc2]T , where X˜c1 =
[X˜c,1 . . . X˜c,N ]
T
, X˜c2 = [X˜c,N+1 · · · X˜c,Nc]T , and X˜c,k = Xc,k + Z˜c,k, k = 1, 2, · · · , Nc. In
addition, let Hc = [Hc1 Hc2], where Hc1 ∈ CN×N and Hc2 =∈ CN×(Nc−N). Using (40), we have
h(HcX
n
c + Z
n
r ) = h(HcX
n
c + Z
′
r
n
) = h(HcX˜
n
c + Z˜
n
r ) (41)
≥ h(HcX˜nc ) = h(Hc1X˜nc1 +Hc2X˜nc2) (42)
≥ h(Hc1X˜nc1|X˜nc2) (43)
= h(X˜nc1|X˜nc2) + n log | det(Hc1)|. (44)
Substituting (44) in (39) yields
nRs ≤ h(Ynr )− h(X˜nc1|X˜nc2)− n log | det(Hc1)|. (45)
Let Yr = [Yr,1 · · · Yr,N ]T . Summing (37) and (45) results in
nRs ≤ 1
2
{
h(Ynr ) + h(X˜
n
t2
) + h(X˜nc2)
}
+ nφ6 (46)
≤ 1
2
n∑
i=1
{
N∑
k=1
h(Yr,k(i)) +
N∑
k=Ne+1
h(X˜t,k(i)) +
Nc∑
k=N+1
h(X˜c,k(i))
}
+ nφ6, (47)
where φ6 = 12 (φ5 − log | det(Hc1)|).
In Appendix B, we show, for i = 1, · · · , n, k = 1, · · · , N , and j = 1, · · · , Nc, that
h(Yr,k(i)) ≤ log 2πe+ log(1 + h2P ) (48)
h(X˜t,k(i)), h(X˜c,j(i)) ≤ log 2πe+ log(ρ2 + P ), (49)
5The choice of Kc guarantees that IN −HcKcHHc is a valid covariance matrix.
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where h2 = max
k
(||hrt,k||2 + ||hrc,k||2); hrt,k and hrc,k denote the transpose of the kth row vectors
of Ht and Hc, respectively. Using (47), (48), and (49), we have
Rs ≤ N
2
log(1 + h2P ) +
Nc −Ne
2
log(ρ2 + P ) + φ7, (50)
where φ7 = φ6 + N+Nc−Ne2 log 2πe. Using (5), we get
Ds ≤ lim
P→∞
N
2
log(1 + h2P ) + Nc−Ne
2
log(ρ2 + P ) + φ7
logP
(51)
=
N +Nc −Ne
2
. (52)
Thus, the s.d.o.f. for Ne ≤ N and N ≤ Nc ≤ N +Ne, is upper bounded by N+Nc−Ne2 .
Case 2: Ne > N
Another stochastically equivalent form of Ze is
Z′′e = GtZ˜t +GcZ˜c + Z˜
′
e. (53)
where6 Z˜′e ∼ CN(0, INe −GtKtGHt −GcKcGHc ) is independent from {Z˜t, Z˜c,Xt,Xc,Zr}. Z˜′ne
is an i.i.d. sequence of the random vectors Z˜′e. Using (53), another stochastically equivalent form
of Yne is given by
Y′′e
n
= GtX˜t +GcX˜
n
c + Z˜
′n
e . (54)
Let us rewrite X˜c and Hc as follows. X˜c = [X˜′Tc1 X˜
′T
c2
]T , where X˜′c1 = [X˜c,1 · · · X˜c,Ne−N ]T ,
X˜′c2 = [X˜
′T
c21
X˜′Tc22]
T
, X˜′c21 = [X˜c,Ne−N+1 · · · X˜c,Ne]T , and X˜′c22 = [X˜c,Ne+1 · · · X˜c,Nc]T . Hc =
[H′c1 H
′
c2
], where H′c1 ∈ CN×(Ne−N), H′c2 = [H′c21 Hc22 ], H′c21 ∈ CN×N , and Hc22 ∈ CN×(Nc−Ne).
Let Gc = [Gc1 Gc2 ], where Gc1 ∈ CNe×(Ne−N) and Gc2 ∈ CNe×(N+Nc−Ne). Using (54), we have
h(Yne ) = h(Y
′′
e
n
) = h([Gt Gc1 ]
X˜nt
X˜′nc1
+Gc2X˜′nc2 + Z˜′ne ) (55)
≥ h(X˜nt , X˜′nc1|X˜′nc2) + n log | det[Gt Gc1]| (56)
≥ h(X˜nt ) + h(X˜′nc1|X˜′nc2) + n log | det[Gt Gc1 ]|, (57)
6The choice of Kt and Kc guarantees that INe −GtKtGHt −GcKcGHc is a valid covariance matrix.
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where (57) follows since X˜nt and X˜′nc2 are independent. Substituting (57) in (29) gives
nRs ≤ h(X˜′nc2) + nφ8, (58)
where φ8 = φ4 − log | det[Gt Gc1 ]|.
In order to obtain another upper bound for Rs, which we combine with (58) to obtain the
desired bound for Ne > N and Ne ≤ Nc ≤ N + Ne, we proceed as follows. Consider a
modified channel where the first Ne −N antennas at the cooperative jammer are removed, i.e.,
the cooperative jammer uses only the last N +Nc −Ne out of its Nc antennas. The transmitted
signals in the modified channel are Xnt and X′nc2 , and hence, the legitimate receiver receives
Y¯nr = HtX
n
t +H
′
c2
X′nc2 + Z
n
r . (59)
Since the cooperative jamming signal is additive interference for the legitimate receiver, the
reliable communication rate of this modified channel, R¯, is an upper bound for that of the
original channel, R. Since Rs satisfies the reliability and secrecy constraints in (3) and (4), we
have that
nRs ≤ nR ≤ nR¯ ≤ I(Xnt ; Y¯nr ) = h(Y¯nr )− h(H′c2X′nc2 + Znr ). (60)
Let Z˜c2 = [Z˜c,Ne−N+1 · · · Z˜c,Nc]T ∼ CN(0,K′c), where K′c = ρ2IN+Nc−Ne . Another stochastically
equivalent form of Zr is Z′′r = H′c2Z˜c2+Z˜
′
r, where7 Z˜′r ∼ CN(0, IN−H′c2K′cH′Hc2 ) is independent
from {Z˜t, Z˜c,Xt,Xc,Ze}, and Z˜′nr is an i.i.d. sequence of Z˜′r. Thus, using (60), we have
nRs ≤ h(Y¯nr )− h(H′c2X˜′nc2 + Z˜′nr ) ≤ h(Y¯nr )− h(H′c2X˜′nc2) (61)
≤ h(Y¯nr )− h(X˜′nc21 |X˜′nc22)− n log | det(H′c21)|. (62)
Let Y¯r = [Y¯r,1 · · · Y¯r,N ]T . Summing (58) and (62) yields
nRs ≤ 1
2
{
h(Y¯nr ) + h(X˜
′n
c22
)
}
+ nφ9 (63)
≤ 1
2
n∑
i=1
{
N∑
k=1
h(Y¯r,k(i)) +
Nc∑
k=Ne+1
h(X˜c,k(i))
}
+ nφ9, (64)
7The choice of Kc guarantees that IN −H′c2K
′
cH
′H
c2
is a valid covariance matrix.
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where φ9 = 12{φ8 − log | det(H′c21)|}. In Appendix. B, we also show that
h(Y¯r,k(i)) ≤ log 2πe+ log(1 + h¯2P ), (65)
where h¯2 = max
k
(||hrt,k||2 + ||h′rc,k||2); h′rc,k denotes the transpose of the kth row vector of H′c2 .
Similar to case 1, using (64), (65), and (49), the secrecy rate is bounded as
Rs ≤ N
2
log(1 + h¯2P ) +
Nc −Ne
2
log(ρ2 + P ) + nφ10, (66)
where φ10 = φ9 + N+Nc−Ne2 log 2πe. Thus, the s.d.o.f., for Ne > N and Ne ≤ Nc ≤ N +Ne, is
upper bounded as
Ds ≤ N +Nc −Ne
2
. (67)
C. Obtaining the Upper Bound
For Ne ≤ N , the upper bound for the s.d.o.f. derived in Section IV-A is equal to N+Nc−Ne,
for all 0 ≤ Nc ≤ Ne. while the upper bound derived in Section IV-B, at Nc = N , is equal to
N − Ne
2
, c.f. equations (15) and (52). As the former upper bound is greater than the latter for
all Ne
2
< Nc ≤ N , the s.d.o.f. is upper bounded by N − Ne2 for all Ne2 < Nc ≤ N . Combining
these statements, we have the following upper bound for the s.d.o.f. for Ne ≤ N :
Ds ≤

N +Nc −Ne, for 0 ≤ Nc ≤ Ne2
N − Ne
2
, for Ne
2
< Nc ≤ N
N+Nc−Ne
2
, for N < Nc ≤ N +Ne.
(68)
Similarly, when Ne > N and for all Ne − N2 < Nc ≤ Ne, the upper bound derived for
0 ≤ Nc ≤ Ne in Section IV-A is greater than the upper bound derived in Section IV-B at
Nc = Ne. Thus, the s.d.o.f. for Ne − N2 < Nc ≤ Ne is upper bounded by N2 . In addition, the
upper bound in (15) is equal to zero for all 0 ≤ Nc ≤ Ne −N . Thus, the s.d.o.f. for Ne > N is
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upper bounded as:
Ds ≤

0, for 0 ≤ Nc ≤ Ne −N
N +Nc −Ne, for Ne −N < Nc ≤ Ne − N2
N
2
, for Ne − N2 < Nc ≤ Ne
N+Nc−Ne
2
, for Ne < Nc ≤ N +Ne.
(69)
By combining the bounds for Ne ≤ N in (68) and for Ne > N in (69), we obtain the upper
bound for the s.d.o.f. in (6). In the next Section, we will show the achievability of (6).
V. ACHIEVABLILITY FOR Nt = Nr = N
In this section, we provide the achievability proof for Theorem 1 by showing the achievability
of (68) when Ne ≤ N , and the achievability of (69) when Ne > N . For both Ne ≤ N and
Ne > N , we divide the range of the number of antennas at the cooperative jammer, Nc, into five
ranges and propose an achievable scheme for each range. For all the achievable schemes in this
section, we have the n-letter signals, Xnt and Xnc , as i.i.d. sequences. Since Xnc is independent
from Xnt , and each of them is i.i.d. across time, we have in effect a memoryless wire-tap channel
and the secrecy rate
Rs = [I(Xt;Yr)− I(Xt;Ye)]+, (70)
is achievable by stochastic encoding at the transmitter [2].
The transmitted signals at the transmitter and the cooperative jammer, for each of the following
schemes, are
Xt = PtUt, Xc = PcVc, (71)
where Ut = [U1 · · ·Ud]T and Vc = [V1 · · ·Vl]T are the information and cooperative jamming
streams, respectively. Pt = [pt,1 · · ·pt,d] ∈ CN×d and Pc = [pc,1 · · ·pc,l] ∈ CNc×l are the
precoding matrices at the transmitter and the cooperative jammer.
Signaling, precoding, and decoding techniques utilized in this proof vary according to the
relative number of antennas at the different terminals and whether the s.d.o.f. of the channel
is integer valued or not an integer. In particular, we show that Gaussian signaling both for
17
transmission and cooperative jamming is sufficient to achieve the integer valued s.d.o.f., while
achieving non-integer s.d.o.f. requires structured signaling and cooperative jamming along with
a combination of linear receiver processing, and the complex field equivalent of real interference
alignment [36], [37]. Additionally, the linear precoding at the transmitter and the cooperative
jammer depends on whether Ne is equal to, smaller than, or larger than N , and whether the
number of antennas at the cooperative jammer, Nc, results in a s.d.o.f. for the channel that is
before, after, or at the flat s.d.o.f. range in the s.d.o.f. plot versus Nc. This leads to an achievability
proof that involves 10 distinct achievable schemes, which differ from each other in the type of
signals used (Gaussian or structured), and/or precoding at the transmitter and cooperative jammer,
and/or decoding at the legitimate receiver.
In order to extend real interference alignment to complex channels, we need to utilize different
results than those used for real channels. For real channels, to analyze the decoder performance,
reference [41] proposed utilizing the convergence part of Khintchine-Groshev theorem in the
field of Diophantine approximation [42], which deals with the approximation of real numbers
with rational numbers. For complex channels, transforming the channel into a real channel with
twice the dimensions, as is usually the convention, is not sufficient here, since real interference
alignment relies on the linear independence over rational numbers of the channel gains, which
does not continue to hold after such channel transformation. Luckily, we can utilize a result in
the field of classification of transcendental complex numbers, which provides a bound on the
absolute value of a complex algebraic number with rational coefficients in terms of its height,
i.e., the maximum coefficient [37]–[39]. For complex channel coefficients, this result ends up
playing the same role of the Khintchine-Groshev theorem for real coefficients.
Before continuing with the achievability proof for the different cases, we state the following
lemma, which is utilized to show the linear independence between the directions of the received
streams at the legitimate receiver.
Lemma 1 Consider two matrices E1 ∈ CN×K and E2 ∈ CK×M , where N,M < K. If the matrix
E2 is full column rank and the matrix E1 has all of its entries independently and randomly drawn
according to a continuous distribution, then rank(E1E2) = min(N,M) a.s.
Proof: The proof of Lemma 1 is given in Appendix C. 
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A. Case 1: Ne ≤ N and 0 ≤ Nc ≤ Ne2
The s.d.o.f. for this case is equal to N + Nc − Ne, i.e., integer valued, for which we utilize
Gaussian signaling and cooperative jamming. Since Ne ≤ N , the transmitter exploits this
advantage by sending a part of its signal invisible to the eavesdropper. There is no need for
linear precoding at the cooperative jammer for this case. Increasing the number of the cooperative
jammer antennas, Nc, increases the s.d.o.f. of the channel.
The transmitted signals, Xt and Xc, are given by (71) with d = N + Nc − Ne, l = Nc,
Ut ∼ CN(0, P¯ Id), Vc ∼ CN(0, P¯ Il), Pc = Il, and
Pt = [Pt,a Pt,n] ∈ CN×d, (72)
where Pt,a = G†tGc in order to align the information streams over the cooperative jamming
streams at the eavesdropper, and the N − Ne columns of Pt,n are chosen to span N(Gt).
P¯ = 1
α
P , in accordance with the power constraints on the transmitted signals at the transmitter
and the cooperative jammer, where α = max
{
l,
∑d
i=1 ||pt,i||2
}
is a constant which does not
depend on the power P .
Since Nc ≤ Ne2 , the total number of superposed received streams at the receiver, 2Nc+N−Ne,
is less than or equal to the number of its available spatial dimensions, N . Thus, the receiver can
decode all the information and cooperative jamming streams at high SNR. Using (1), (2), and
(71), the received signals at the receiver and the eavesdropper are
Yr =
[
HtPt Hc
]Ut
Vc
+ Zr, (73)
Ye =
[
GtG
†
tGc 0Ne×(N−Ne)
] Utl1
Ut
d
l+1
+GcVc + Ze (74)
= Gc(Ut
l
1 +Vc) + Ze. (75)
We lower bound the secrecy rate in (70) as follows. First, in order to compute I(Xt;Yr), we
show that the matrix [HtPt Hc] ∈ CN×(d+l) in (73) is full column-rank a.s.
The columns of Pt,a = G†tGc are linearly independent a.s. due to the randomly generated
channel gains, and the N−Ne columns of Pt,n are linearly independent as well, since they span
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an N−Ne-dimensional subspace. In addition, each of the columns of Pt,a is linearly independent
from the columns of Pt,n a.s. since GtPt,a = Gc, and hence Gtpti 6= 0 for all i = 1, 2, · · · , l.
Thus Pt = [Pt,a Pt,n] is full column rank a.s. The matrix [HtPt Hc] can be written as
[
HtPt Hc
]
=
[
Ht Hc
] Pt 0N×l
0l×d Il
 . (76)
The matrix [Ht Hc] has all of its entries independently and randomly drawn according to a
continuous distribution, while the second matrix on the right hand side (RHS) of (76) is full
column rank a.s. By applying Lemma 1 to (76), we have that the matrix [HtPt Hc] is full
column rank a.s. Thus, using (73), we obtain the lower bound
I(Xt;Yr) ≥ d logP + o(logP ). (77)
Next, using (75), we upper bound I(Xt;Ye) as follows:
I(Xt;Ye) = h(Ye)− h(Ye|Xt) (78)
= h(Gc(Ut
l
1 +Vc) + Ze)− h(GcVc + Ze) (79)
= log
det(INe + 2P¯GcG
H
c )
det(INe + P¯GcG
H
c )
(80)
= log
det(Il + 2P¯G
H
c Gc)
det(Il + P¯GHc Gc)
(81)
= log
2ldet(1
2
Il + P¯G
H
c Gc)
det(Il + P¯GHc Gc)
(82)
≤ l. (83)
Substituting (77) and (83) in (70), we have
Rs ≥ d logP + o(logP )− l (84)
= (N +Nc −Ne) logP + o(logP )−Nc, (85)
and hence, using (5), we conclude that the achievable s.d.o.f. is Ds ≥ N +Nc −Ne.
B. Case 2: Ne ≤ N, Ne2 < Nc ≤ N , and Ne is even
Unlike case 1, the s.d.o.f. for this case does not increase by increasing Nc. For all Nc in
this case, the transmitter sends the same number of information streams, while the cooperative
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jammer utilizes a linear precoder which allows for discarding any unnecessary antennas. The
s.d.o.f. here is integer valued, and we use Gaussian signaling for transmission and cooperative
jamming.
In particular, for Ne is even, Nc = Ne2 , and Ne ≤ N , the achievable s.d.o.f., using the scheme
in Section V-A, is equal to N − Ne
2
. However, from (68), we observe that the s.d.o.f. is upper
bounded by N − Ne
2
for all Ne
2
< Nc ≤ N . Thus, when Ne ≤ N and Ne is even, the scheme for
Nc =
Ne
2
in Section V-A can be used to achieve the s.d.o.f. for all Ne
2
< Nc ≤ N , where the
cooperative jammer uses the precoder
Pc =
 Il
0(Nc−l)×l
 , (86)
with l = Ne
2
, to utilize only Ne
2
out of its Nc antennas, and the transmitter utilizes
Pt = [Pt,a Pt,n] , (87)
Pt,a = G
†
tGcPc ∈ CN×l, Pt,n ∈ CN×(N−Ne) is defined as in (72), in order to send d = N − Ne2
Gaussian information streams. Following the same analysis as in the previous case, the achievable
s.d.o.f. is N − Ne
2
for all Ne
2
< Nc ≤ N , where Ne is even and Ne ≤ N .
C. Case 3: Ne ≤ N , Ne2 < Nc ≤ N , and Ne is odd
The s.d.o.f. for this case is equal to N− Ne
2
, which is not an integer. As Gaussian signaling can
not achieve fractional s.d.o.f. for the channel, we utilize structured signaling both for transmission
and cooperative jamming for this case. In particular, we propose utilizing joint signal space
alignment and the complex field equivalent of real interference alignment [36], [37].
The decoding scheme at the receiver is as follows. The receiver projects its received signal
over a direction that is orthogonal to all but one information and one cooperative jamming
streams. Then, the receiver decodes these two streams from the projection using complex field
analogy of real interference alignment. Finally, the receiver removes the decoded information
and cooperative jamming streams from its received signal, leaving N − 1 spatial dimensions for
the other N − Ne+1
2
information and Ne−1
2
cooperative jamming streams.
The transmitted signals are given by (71), with d = N− Ne−1
2
, l = Ne+1
2
, Pc,Pt are defined as
in (86) and (87), and Ui = Ui,Re+jUi,Im, Vk = Vk,Re+jVk,Im, i = 2, 3, · · · , d and k = 2, 3, · · · , l.
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The random variables U1, V1, {Ui,Re}di=2, {Ui,Im}di=2, {Vi,Re}li=2, and {Vi,Im}li=2 are i.i.d. uniform
over the set {a(−Q,Q)Z}. The values for a and the integer Q are chosen as
Q =
⌊
P
1−ǫ
2+ǫ
⌋
= P
1−ǫ
2+ǫ − ν (88)
a = γP
3ǫ
2(2+ǫ) , (89)
in order to satisfy the power constraints, where ǫ is an arbitrarily small positive number, and
ν, γ are constants that do not depend on the power P . Justification for the choice of a and Q is
provided in Appendix D.
The received signal at the eavesdropper is
Ye = G˜c(Ut
l
1 +Vc) + Ze, (90)
where G˜c = GcPc. We upper bound the second term in (70), I(Xt;Ye), as follows:
I(Xt;Ye) ≤ I(Xt;Ye,Ze) (91)
= I(Xt;Ye|Ze) (92)
= H(Ye|Ze)−H(Ye|Ze,Xt) (93)
= H
(
G˜c(Ut
l
1 +Vc)
)
−H
(
G˜cVc
)
(94)
= H(Ut
l
1 +Vc)−H(Vc) (95)
= H (U1 + V1, U2,Re + V2,Re, U2,Im + V2,Im, · · · , Ul,Re + Vl,Re, Ul,Im + Vl,Im)
−H (V1, V2,Re, V2,Im, · · · , Vl,Re, Vl,Im) (96)
≤ log(4Q+ 1)2l−1 − log(2Q+ 1)2l−1 (97)
= (2l − 1) log 4Q+ 1
2Q+ 1
(98)
≤ 2l − 1, (99)
where (92) follows since Xt and Ze are independent, and (97) follows since the entropy of
a uniform random variable over the set {a(−2Q, 2Q)Z} upper bounds the entropy of each of
U1+V1, U2,Re+V2,Re, U2,Im+V2,Im, · · · , Ul,Im+Vl,Im. Equation (95) follows since the mappings
Ut
l
1+Vc 7→ G˜c(Utl1+Vc) and Vc 7→ G˜cVc are bijective. The reason for this is that the entries
of G˜c are rationally independent, and that (Utl1 +Vc), Vc belong to Zl[j].
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Definition 1 A set of complex numbers {c1, c2, · · · , cL} are rationally independent, i.e., linearly
independent over Q, if there is no set of rational numbers {ri}, ri 6= 0 for all i = 1, 2, · · · , L,
such that
∑L
i=1 rici = 0.
Next, we derive a lower bound for I(Xt;Yr). The received signal at the legitimate receiver
is given by
Yr = AUt +H
′
cVc + Zr, (100)
where A = HtPt = [a1 a2 · · · ad] and H′c = HcPc = [hc,1 hc,2 · · · hc,l]. The receiver chooses
b ∈ CN such that b ⊥ span {a2, · · · , ad,hc,2, · · · ,hc,l} and obtains
Y˜r = DYr (101)
where
D =
 bH
0(N−1)×1 IN−1
 . (102)
Due to the fact that channel gains are continuous and randomly generated, a1 and hc,1 are
linearly independent from span {a2, · · · , ad,hc,2, · · · ,hc,l}, and hence, b is not orthogonal to
a1 and hc,1 a.s. Thus, we have
Y˜r =
 Y˜r1
Y˜Nr2
 =
bHa1 01×(d−1)
A˜
 U1
Ut
d
2
+
bHhc,1 01×(l−1)
H˜c
 V1
Vc
l
2
+
bHZr
Zr
N
2
 , (103)
where A˜ = [a˜1 a˜2 · · · a˜d] ∈ C(N−1)×d, a˜i = aiN2 for all i = 1, 2, · · · , d. Similarly, H˜c =
[h˜c,1 h˜c,2 · · · h˜c,l] ∈ C(N−1)×l, where h˜c,2 = hc,iN2 for all i = 1, 2, · · · , l.
Next, the receiver uses Y˜r1 to decode the information stream U1 and the cooperative jamming
stream V1 as follows. Let Z ′ = bHZr ∼ CN(0, ||b||2), f1 = bHa1, and f2 = bHhc,1. Thus, Y˜r1
is given by
Y˜r1 = f1U1 + f2V1 + Z
′. (104)
Once again, with randomly generated channel gains, f1 = bHa1 and f2 = bHhc,1 are rationally
independent a.s. Thus, the mapping (U1, V1) 7→ f1U1 + f2V1 is invertible [41]. The receiver
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employs a hard decision decoder which maps Y˜r1 ∈ Y˜r1 to the nearest point in the constellation
R1 = f1U1 + f2V1, where U1,V1 = {a(−Q,Q)Z}. Then, the receiver passes the output of the
hard decision decoder through the bijective mapping f1U1 + f2V1 7→ (U1, V1) in order to decode
both U1 and V1.
The receiver can now use
Y¯r = Y˜
N
r2
− a˜1U1 − h˜c,1V1 (105)
=
[
a˜2 · · · a˜d
]
Ut
d
2 +
[
h˜c,2 · · · h˜c,l
]
Vc
l
2 + Zr
N
2 (106)
= B
Utd2
Vc
l
2
+ ZrN2 , (107)
to decode U2, · · · , Ud, where,
B =
[
a˜2 · · · a˜d h˜c,2 · · · h˜c,l
]
∈ C(N−1)×(N−1), (108)
is full rank a.s. To show that B is full rank a.s., let H¯t and H¯c be generated by removing the
first row from Ht and Hc, and let P¯t and P¯c be generated by removing the first column from
Pt and Pc, respectively. B can be rewritten as
B =
[
H¯t H¯c
] P¯t 0N×(l−1)
0Nc×(d−1) P¯c
 . (109)
Note that
[
H¯t H¯c
]
has all of its entries independently and randomly drawn from a continuous
distribution, and the second matrix in the RHS of (109) is full column rank. Using Lemma 1,
the matrix B is full rank a.s.
Hence, by zero forcing, the receiver obtains
Ŷr = B
−1Y¯r =
Utd2
Vc
l
2
+ Z¯r, (110)
where Z¯r = B−1ZrN2 ∼ CN
(
0,B−1B−H
)
. Thus, at high SNR, the receiver can decode the other
information streams, U2, · · · , Ud, from Ŷr.
The mutual information between the transmitter and receiver is lower bounded as follows:
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I(Xt;Yr) ≥ I(Ut; Y˜r) (111)
= I(U1,Ut
d
2; Y˜r1, Y˜
N
r2
) (112)
= I(U1,Ut
d
2; Y˜r1) + I(U1,Ut
d
2; Y˜
N
r2
|Y˜r1) (113)
= I(U1; Y˜r1) + I(Ut
d
2; Y˜r1|U1) + I(U1; Y˜Nr2|Y˜r1) + I(Utd2; Y˜Nr2|U1, Y˜r1) (114)
≥ I(U1; Y˜r1) + I(Utd2; Y˜Nr2|U1, Y˜r1), (115)
where (111) follows since Ut − Xt − Yr − Y˜r forms a Markov chain. We next lower bound
each term in the RHS of (115).
We lower bound the first term, I(U1; Y˜r1) as follows, see also [36], [41]. Let Pe1 denote
the probability of error in decoding U1 at the receiver, i.e., Pe1 = Pr
{
Uˆ1 6= U1
}
, where Uˆi,
i = 1, 2, · · · , d, is the estimate of Ui at the legitimate receiver. Thus, using Fano’s inequality,
we have
I(U1; Y˜r1) = H(U1)−H(U1|Y˜r1) (116)
≥ H(U1)− 1− Pe1 log |U1| (117)
= (1− Pe1) log(2Q+ 1)− 1. (118)
From (104), since the mapping (U1, V1) 7→ f1U1 + f2V1 is invertible, the only source of error
in decoding U1 from Y˜r1 is the additive Gaussian noise Z ′. Note that, since Z ′ ∼ CN(0, ||b||2),
Re{Z ′} and Im{Z ′} are i.i.d. with N
(
0, ||b||
2
2
)
distribution, and |Z ′| ∼ Rayleigh
(
||b||√
2
)
. Thus,
we have
Pe1 = Pr
{
Uˆ1 6= U1
}
(119)
≤ Pr
{
(Uˆ1, Vˆ1) 6= (U1, V1)
}
(120)
≤ Pr
{
|Z ′| ≥ dmin
2
}
(121)
= exp
(−d2min
4||b||2
)
, (122)
where dmin is the minimum distance between the points in the constellation R1 = f1U1 + f2V1.
In order to upper bound Pe1 , we lower bound dmin. To do so, similar to [36], we extend real
interference alignment [41] to complex channels. In particular, we utilize the following results
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from number theory:
Definition 2 [37] The Diophantine exponent ω(z) of z ∈ Cn is defined as
ω(z) = sup
{
v : |p+ z.q| ≤ (||q||∞)−v for infinetly many q ∈ Zn, p ∈ Z
}
, (123)
where q = [q1 q2 · · · qn]T and ||q||∞ = max
i
|qi|.
Lemma 2 [37] For almost all z ∈ Cn, the Diophantine exponent ω(z) is equal to n−1
2
.
Lemma 2 implies the following:
Corollary 1 For almost all z ∈ Cn and for all ǫ > 0,
|p+ z.q| > (max
i
|qi|)−
(n−1+ǫ)
2 , (124)
holds for all q ∈ Zn and p ∈ Z except for finitely many of them.
Since the number of integers that violate the inequality in (124) is finite, there exists a constant
κ such that, for almost all z ∈ Cn and all ǫ > 0, the inequality
|p+ z.q| > κ(max
i
|qi|)−
(n−1+ǫ)
2 , (125)
holds for all q ∈ Zn and p ∈ Z.
Thus, for almost all channel gains, the minimum distance dmin is lower bounded as follows:
dmin = inf
Y ′r1
,Y ′′r1
∈R1
|Y ′r1 − Y ′′r1| (126)
= inf
U1,V1∈{a(−2Q,2Q)Z}
|f1U1 + f2V1| (127)
= inf
U1,V1∈(−2Q,2Q)Z
a|f1|
∣∣∣∣U1 + f2f1V1
∣∣∣∣ (128)
≥ κ a|f1|
(2Q)
ǫ
2
(129)
≥ κγ|f1|2− ǫ2P ǫ2 , (130)
where (129) follows from (125), and (130) follows by substituting (88) and (89) in (129).
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Substituting (130) in (122) gives the following bound on Pe1 ,
Pe1 ≤ exp(−µP ǫ), (131)
where µ = κ
2γ2|f1|22−ǫ
4||b||2 is a constant which does not depend on the power P . Thus, using (118)
and (131), we have
I(U1; Y˜r1) ≥ (1− exp(−µP ǫ)) log(2Q + 1)− 1. (132)
Next, we lower bound the second term in the RHS of (115), I(Utd2; Y˜Nr2|U1, Y˜r1). Let B˜ =[
0(N−1)×1 IN−1
]
− 1
f2
h˜c,1b
H
, and
Y¯′r = B
Utd2
Vc
l
2
+ B˜Zr (133)
Ŷ′r = B
−1Y¯′r =
Utd2
Vc
l
2
+B−1B˜Zr, (134)
where B is defined as in (108). Thus, we have
I
(
Ut
d
2; Y˜
N
r2
|U1, Y˜r1
)
= I
(
Ut
d
2; A˜Ut + H˜cVc + Zr
N
2
∣∣U1, f2V1 + Z ′) (135)
= I
Utd2;B
Utd2
Vc
l
2
+ ZrN2 − 1f2 h˜c,1bHZr
∣∣∣∣f2V1 + Z ′
 (136)
= I(Ut
d
2; Y¯
′
r|f2V1 + Z ′) (137)
≥ I(Utd2; Y¯′r) (138)
≥ I(Utd2; Ŷ′r) (139)
= H(Ut
d
2)−H(Utd2|Ŷ′r) (140)
≥ H(Utd2)− P de2 log(2Q+ 1)2(d−1) − 1 (141)
= 2(d− 1) (1− P de2) log(2Q + 1)− 1, (142)
where P de2 = Pr{(Uˆ2, Uˆ3, · · · , Uˆd) 6= (U2, U3, · · · , Ud)}, (135) follows from (103), (138) follows
since Utd2 and f2V1 + Z ′ are independent, (139) follows since Utd2 − Y¯′r − Ŷ′r forms a Markov
chain, and (141) follows from Fano’s inequality.
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Let Ẑr = ΘZr = [Zˆr2 · · · ZˆrN ]T , where Θ = B−1B˜. Thus, Ẑr ∼ CN(0,ΘΘH) and
|Zˆri| ∼ Rayleigh(σi), where σ2i = ΘΘH(i, i), i = 2, 3, · · · , N . Using the union bound, we have
P de2 = Pr
{
(Uˆ2, Uˆ3, · · · , Uˆd) 6= (U2, U3, · · · , Ud)
}
(143)
≤
d∑
i=2
Pr
{
Uˆi 6= Ui
}
(144)
≤
d∑
i=2
Pr
{
|Zˆri| ≥
a
2
}
(145)
=
d∑
i=2
exp
(
− a
2
8σ2i
)
(146)
≤ (d− 1) exp
(
− γ
2
8σ2max
P
3ǫ
2+ǫ
)
(147)
= (d− 1) exp(−µ′P ǫ′), (148)
where σmax = max
i
σi, µ
′ = γ
2
8σ2max
, ǫ′ = 3ǫ
2+ǫ
, and (147) follows by substituting (89) in (146).
Substituting (148) in (142) yields
I
(
Ut
d
2; Y˜
N
r2
|U1, Y˜r1
)
≥
(
2d− 2− 2(d− 1)2 exp(−µ′P ǫ′)
)
log(2Q+ 1)− 1. (149)
Using (88), (115), (132), and (149), we have
I(Xt;Yr) ≥
[
2d− 1− exp(−µP ǫ)− 2(d− 1)2 exp(−µ′P ǫ′)
]
log(2P
1−ǫ
2+ǫ − 2ν + 1)− 2 (150)
=
1− ǫ
2 + ǫ
[
2d− 1− exp(−µP ǫ)− 2(d− 1)2 exp(−µ′P ǫ′)
]
logP + o(logP ). (151)
Using the upper bound in (99) and the lower bound in (151), we get
Rs ≥ 1− ǫ
2 + ǫ
[
2d− 1− exp(−µP ǫ)− 2(d− 1)2 exp(−µ′P ǫ′)
]
logP + o(logP )− (2l − 1)
(152)
=
1− ǫ
2 + ǫ
[
2N −Ne − exp(−µP ǫ)− 1
2
(2N −Ne − 1)2 exp(−µ′P ǫ′)
]
logP + o(logP )−Ne.
(153)
Thus, it follows that the s.d.o.f. is lower bounded as
Ds ≥ (1− ǫ)(2N −Ne)
2 + ǫ
. (154)
28
Since ǫ > 0 can be chosen arbitrarily small, we can achieve s.d.o.f. of N − Ne
2
.
D. Case 4: Ne ≤ N , N < Nc ≤ N +Ne, and N +Nc −Ne is even
Since Nc > N for this case, the cooperative jammer, unlike the previous three cases, chooses
its precoder such that Nc−N of its jamming streams are sent invisible to the receiver, in order
to allow for more space for the information streams at the receiver. The s.d.o.f. for this case
is integer valued, which we can achieve using Gaussian information and cooperative jamming
streams.
The transmitted signals are given by (71), with d = N+Nc−Ne
2
, l = Nc+Ne−N
2
,Ut ∼ CN
(
0, P¯ Id
)
,
Vc ∼ CN
(
0, P¯ Il
)
,
Pc = [Pc,I Pc,n], (155)
where Pc,I is given by
Pc,I =
 Ig
0(Nc−g)×g
 , (156)
g = Ne+N−Nc
2
, and Pc,n ∈ CNc×(Nc−N) is a matrix whose columns span N(Hc), Pt is defined as
in Section V-B, and P¯ = 1
α′
P , where α′ = max
{∑d
i=1 ||pt,i||2, g +
∑l
i=g+1 ||pc,i||2
}
. At high
SNR, the receiver can decode the d information and the g cooperative jamming streams, where
d+ g = N .
The received signals at the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper are given by
Yr = HtPtUt +
[
HcPc,I 0N×(Nc−N)
] Vcg1
Vc
l
g+1
+ Zr (157)
=
[
HtPt HcPc,I
]Ut
Vc
g
1
+ Zr (158)
Ye = G˜c(Ut
l
1 +Vc) + Ze, (159)
where G˜c = GcPc.
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The matrix [HtPt HcPc,I] ∈ CN×N in (158) can be rewritten as
[
HtPt HcPc,I
]
=
[
Ht Hc
] Pt 0N×g
0Nc×d Pc,I
 . (160)
By applying Lemma 1 on (160), the matrix [HtPt HcPc,I] is full rank a.s. Thus,
I(Xt;Yr) ≥ d logP + o(logP ). (161)
Using similar steps as from (78) to (83), we can show that
I(Xt;Ye) = log
det(Il + 2P¯ G˜
H
c G˜c)
det(Il + P¯G˜Hc G˜c)
≤ l. (162)
Thus, the achievable secrecy rate in (70) is lower bounded as
Rs ≥ d logP + o(logP )− l (163)
=
N +Nc −Ne
2
logP + o(logP )− Nc +Ne −N
2
, (164)
and, using (5), the s.d.o.f. is lower bounded as
Ds ≥ N +Nc −Ne
2
. (165)
E. Case 5: Ne ≤ N , N < Nc ≤ N +Ne, and N +Nc −Ne is odd
As in case 3, the s.d.o.f. for this case is not an integer, and as in case 4, we have Nc > N ,
which allows the cooperative jammer to send some signals invisible to the receiver. Consequently,
the achievable scheme for this case combines the techniques used in Sections V-C and V-D.
The transmitted signals are given by (71) with d = N+Nc−Ne+1
2
, l = Nc+Ne−N+1
2
, Pt and Pc
are defined as in Section V-D with g = Ne+N−Nc+1
2
, and Ut, Vc are defined as in Section V-C.
Similar to the proof in Appendix D, the values of Q and a are chosen as in (88) and (89), with
γ =
1√
max
{
‖|pt,1||2 + 2
∑d
i=2 ||pt,i||2, 2g − 1 + 2
∑l
i=g+1 ||pc,i||2
} , (166)
and ν are constants that do not depend on the power P .
The legitimate receiver uses the projection and cancellation technique described in Section
V-C in order to decode the information streams. The received signal at the eavesdropper is the
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same as in (159), with l = Nc+Ne−N+1
2
. Similar to the derivation from (91) to (99), we have
I(Xt;Ye) ≤ 2l − 1. (167)
Let A = HtPt = [a1 · · ·ad], and H′c = HcPc,I = [hc,1 · · ·hc,g]. The received signal at the
legitimate receiver is
Yr =
[
A H′c
]Ut
Vc
g
1
+ Zr. (168)
The receiver chooses b ⊥ span{a2, · · · , ad,hc2, · · · ,hcg} and multiplies its received signal by
the matrix D given in (102) to obtain Y˜r =
[
Y˜r1 (Y˜
N
r2
)T
]T
, where
Y˜r1 = f1U1 + f2V1 + Z
′, (169)
Y˜Nr2 = A˜Ut + H˜cVc
g
1 + Zr
N
2 , (170)
f1, f2, Z
′
, A˜, and H˜c, are defined as in Section V-C. In order to decode U1 and V1, the receiver
passes Y˜r1 through a hard decision decoder, Y˜r1 7→ f1U1 + f2V1, and passes the output of the
hard decision decoder through the bijective map f1U1 + f2V1 7→ (U1, V1), where f1 and f2 are
rationally independent.
Using similar steps to the derivation from (111) to (151) in Section V-C, we obtain
I(Xt;Yr) ≥ 1− ǫ
2 + ǫ
[
2d− 1− exp (−µP ǫ)− 2(d− 1)2 exp(−µ′P ǫ′)
]
logP + o(logP ), (171)
where ǫ > 0 is arbitrarily small, ǫ′ = 3ǫ
2+ǫ
, and µ, µ′ are constants which do not depend on P .
Thus, the achievable secrecy rate in (70) is lower bounded as
Rs ≥ 1− ǫ
2 + ǫ
[
2d− 1− exp(−µP ǫ)− (d− 1)2 exp(−µ′P ǫ′)
]
logP + o(logP )− (2l − 1) (172)
=
1− ǫ
2 + ǫ
[
N +Nc −Ne − exp(−µP ǫ)− 1
2
(N +Nc −Ne − 1)2 exp(−µ′P ǫ′)
]
logP
+ o(logP )− (Nc +Ne −N), (173)
and hence the s.d.o.f is lower bounded as
Ds ≥ (1− ǫ)(N +Nc −Ne)
2 + ǫ
. (174)
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Since ǫ > 0 can be chosen arbitrarily small, Ds = N+Nc−Ne2 is achievable for this case, which
completes the achievability of (68). Next, we show the achievability of (69), where Ne > N ,
i.e., the eavesdropper has more antennas than the legitimate receiver.
F. Case 6: Ne > N and Ne −N < Nc ≤ Ne − N2
Unlike the previous five cases, since Ne > N , no information streams can be sent invisible
to the eavesdropper. In fact, the precoder at the transmitter is not adequate for achieving the
alignment of the information and cooperative jamming streams at the eavesdropper. We need to
design both precoders at the transmitter and the cooperative jammer to take part in achieving
the alignment condition. The s.d.o.f. here is integer valued, and hence we can utilize Gaussian
streams.
The transmitted signals are given by (71), with d = l = N + Nc − Ne, and Ut,Vc ∼
CN
(
0, P¯ Id
)
. The matrices Pt and Pc are chosen as follows. LetG = [Gt −Gc] ∈ CNe×(N+Nc),
and let Q ∈ C(N+Nc)×d be a matrix whose columns are randomly8 chosen to span N(G). Write
the matrix Q as Q =
[
QT1 Q
T
2
]T
, where Q1 ∈ CN×d and Q2 ∈ CNc×d. Set Pt = Q1 and
Pc = Q2. P¯ =
1
α′′
P , where α′′ = max
{∑d
i=1 ||pt,i||2,
∑d
i=1 ||pc,i||2
}
.
The choice of Pt and Pc results in GtPt = GcPc. Thus, the eavesdropper receives
Ye = GcPc(Ut +Vc) + Ze. (175)
Similar to going from (78) to (83), it follows that we have
I(Xt;Ye) ≤ N +Nc −Ne. (176)
The received signal at the receiver in turn is given by
Yr =
[
HtPt HcPc
]Ut
Vc
+ Zr. (177)
Note that, without conditioning on Gt and Gc, the matrix Q has all of its entries independently
and randomly drawn according to a continuous distribution. Thus, each of Pt and Pc is full
column rank a.s. Thus, by using Lemma 1, we can show that the matrix [HtPt HcPc] is full
8Out of all possible sets of d = N + Nc − Ne linearly independent vectors which span N(G), the columns of Q are the
elements of one randomly chosen set.
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column rank a.s. Using (177), we have
I(Xt;Yr) ≥ (N +Nc −Ne) logP + o(logP ). (178)
Hence, using (176), (178), (70), and (5), the s.d.o.f. is lower bounded as Ds ≥ N +Nc −Ne.
G. Case 7: Ne > N , Ne − N2 < Nc ≤ Ne, and N is even
The s.d.o.f. for this case does not increase by increasing Nc. The scheme in Section V-F for
Nc = Ne − N2 , i.e., d = N2 , can be used to achieve the s.d.o.f. for all Ne − N2 < Nc ≤ Ne, when
Ne > N and N is even. However, since dim(N(G)) = N +Nc −Ne > N2 , the d = N2 columns
of the matrix Q are randomly chosen as linearly independent vectors from N(G). Following the
same analysis as in Section V-F, we can show that the s.d.o.f. is lower bounded as Ds ≥ N2 .
H. Case 8: Ne > N , Ne − N2 < Nc ≤ Ne, and N is odd
The difference here from Section V-G is that s.d.o.f. is not an integer, and hence, structured
signaling for transmission and cooperative jamming is needed, and the difference from V-C is
that Ne > N , and hence both the precoders at the transmitter and cooperative jammer have to
participate in achieving the alignment condition at the eavesdropper.
The transmitted signals are given by (71), with d = l = N+1
2
, Ut and Vc are defined as in
Section V-C, and the values for Q and a are chosen as in (88) and (89), with
γ =
1√
max
{
‖|pt,1||2 + 2
∑d
i=2 ||pt,i||2, ||pc,1||2 + 2
∑d
i=2 ||pc,i||2
} , (179)
and ν are constants which do not depend P . Pt,Pc are chosen as in Section V-G, with d = N+12 .
The eavesdropper’s received signal is the same as in (175). Similar to (91)-(99), we have
I(Xt;Ye) ≤ N. (180)
The receiver employs the decoding scheme in Sections V-C and V-E. Following similar steps
as in Sections V-C and V-E, we have
I(Xt;Yr) ≥ (1− ǫ)N
2 + ǫ
logP + o(logP ). (181)
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Using (180), (181), (70), and (5), the s.d.o.f. is lower bounded as Ds ≥ (1−ǫ)N2+ǫ , and since ǫ > 0
is arbitrarily small, the s.d.o.f. of N
2
is achievable for this case.
I. Case 9: Ne > N , Ne < Nc ≤ N +Ne, and N +Nc −Ne is even
In Sections V-G and V-H, we observe that the flat s.d.o.f. range extends to Nc = Ne, and not
Nc = N as in Sections V-B and V-C. Achieving the alignment of information and cooperative
jamming at the eavesdropper requires that Nc > Ne in order for the cooperative jammer to begin
sending some jamming signals invisible to the legitimate receiver. For this case, in addition to
choosing its precoding matrix jointly with the transmitter to satisfy the alignment condition,
the cooperative jammer chooses its precoder to send Nc −Ne jamming streams invisible to the
receiver. The s.d.o.f. here is integer valued, for which we utilize Gaussian streams.
The transmitted signals are given by (71) with d = l = N+Nc−Ne
2
, and Ut,Vc are defined as in
Section V-F. Let Pt = [Pt,1 Pt,2], and Pc = [Pc,1 Pc,2], where Pt,1 ∈ CN×g, Pt,2 ∈ CN×(Nc−Ne),
Pc,1 ∈ CNc×g, Pc,2 ∈ CNc×(Nc−Ne), and g = Ne+N−Nc2 . The matrices Pt and Pc are chosen as
follows. Let G = [Gt −Gc] ∈ CNe×(N+Nc), and let G′ ∈ C(Ne+N)×(N+Nc) be expressed as
G′ =
 Gt −Gc
0N×N Hc
 . (182)
Let Q′ ∈ C(N+Nc)×(Nc−Ne) be randomly chosen such that its columns span N(G′), and let the
columns of the matrix Q ∈ C(N+Nc)×g be randomly chosen as linearly independent vectors
in N(G), and not in N(G′). Write the matrix Q as Q =
[
QT1 Q
T
2
]T
, and the matrix Q′ as
Q′ =
[
Q′T1 Q
′T
2
]T
, where Q1 ∈ CN×g, Q2 ∈ CNc×g, Q′1 ∈ CN×(Nc−Ne), and Q′2 ∈ CNc×(Nc−Ne).
Set Pt,1 = Q1, Pt,2 = Q′1, Pc,1 = Q2, and Pc,2 = Q′2.
This choice of Pt and Pc results in GtPt = GcPc and HcPc,2 = 0N×(Nc−Ne). Thus, the
received signals at the receiver and eavesdropper are given by
Yr =
[
HtPt HcPc,1
]Ut
Vc
g
1
+ Zr (183)
Ye = GcPc(Ut +Vc) + Ze. (184)
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Using (184), and similar to going from (78) to (83), we have
I(Xt;Ye) ≤ N +Nc −Ne
2
. (185)
Because of the assumption of randomly generated channel gains, each of Pt and Pc is full
column rank a.s. Using Lemma 1, we have the matrix [HtPt HcPc,1] is full column rank a.s.,
and hence, using (183), we have
I(Xt;Yr) ≥ N +Nc −Ne
2
logP + o(logP ). (186)
Thus, using (185), (186), (70), and (5), the s.d.o.f. is lower bounded as Ds ≥ N+Nc−Ne2 .
J. Case 10: Ne > N , Ne < Nc ≤ N +Ne, and N +Nc −Ne is odd
The s.d.o.f. for this case is not an integer, and we have Nc > Ne, and hence, we utilize here
precoding as in Section V-I, and signaling and decoding scheme as in Section V-H; Ut,Vc are
defined as in Section V-H, and Pt,Pc are chosen as in Section V-I, with d = N+Nc−Ne+12 and
g = Ne+N−Nc+1
2
. Using the same decoding scheme as in Section V-H, we obtain that the s.d.o.f.
is lower bounded as Ds ≥ N+Nc−Ne2 for this case, which completes the achievability proof of
(69). Thus, we have completed the proof for Theorem 1.
VI. EXTENDING TO THE GENERAL CASE: THEOREM 2
A. Converse
The converse proof for Theorem 2 follows the same steps as in Section IV. In particular, we
derive the following two upper bounds which hold for two different ranges of Nc.
1) 0 ≤ Nc ≤ Ne: Similar to Section IV-A, we have
Rs ≤ Cs(P ) = ρ logP + o(logP ), (187)
where, for 0 ≤ Nc ≤ [Ne − [Nt −Nr]+]+, ρ = [Nc +Nt −Ne]+. Since [Nc +Nt −Ne]+ ≤ Nr
for [Ne − [Nt −Nr]+]+ ≤ Nc ≤ Ne, we have, for 0 ≤ Nc ≤ Ne,
Ds ≤ min{Nr, [Nc +Nt −Ne]+}. (188)
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2) Nr+[Ne−Nt]+ < Nc ≤ 2min{Nt, Nr}+Ne−Nt: Following the same steps as in Section
IV-B, where the two cases we consider here are Ne ≤ Nt and Ne > Nt, the s.d.o.f. for this
range of Nc is upper bounded as
Ds ≤ Nc +Nt −Ne
2
. (189)
Note that, when Ne > Nt, this bound holds for Nc > Nr + Ne − Nt so that the number of
antennas at the cooperative jammer in the modified channel, c.f. (59), is larger than Nr, i.e.,
Nc +Nt −Ne > Nr.
3) Obtaining the upper bound: For each of the following cases, we use the two bounds in
(188) and (189) to obtain the upper bound for the s.d.o.f.
i) Nt ≥ Nr +Ne
For this case, we use the trivial bound for the s.d.o.f., Ds ≤ Nr for all the values of Nc.
ii) Nr ≥ Nt ≥ Ne and Nr ≥ Nt +Ne
Using the bound in (188), we have
Ds ≤ Nc +Nt −Ne, for 0 ≤ Nc ≤ Ne,
where at Nc = Ne, we have Ds ≤ Nt, which is the maximum achievable s.d.o.f. for this
case.
iii) Nt ≥ Ne and Nt −Ne < Nr < Nt +Ne
Combining the bounds in (188) and (189), as in Section IV-C, yields
Ds ≤

Nc +Nt −Ne, 0 ≤ Nc ≤ Nr+Ne−Nt2
Nr+Nt−Ne
2
, Nr+Ne−Nt
2
≤ Nc ≤ Nr
Nc+Nt−Ne
2
, Nr ≤ Nc ≤ 2min{Nt, Nr}+Ne −Nt.
(190)
iv) Ne > Nt and Nr ≥ 2Nt
Using the bound in (188), we have
Ds ≤ [Nc +Nt −Ne]+, for 0 ≤ Nc ≤ Ne.
v) Ne > Nt and Nr < 2Nt
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By combining the bounds in (188) and (189), we have
Ds ≤

[Nc +Nt −Ne]+, 0 ≤ Nc ≤ Nr2 +Ne −Nt
Nr
2
, Nr
2
+Ne −Nt ≤ Nc ≤ Nr +Ne −Nt
Nc+Nt−Ne
2
, Nr +Ne −Nt ≤ Nc ≤ 2min{Nt, Nr}+Ne −Nt.
(191)
One can easily verify that the cases cited above cover all possible combinations of number of
antennas at various terminals. By merging the upper bounds for these cases in one expression,
we obtain (7) as the upper bound for the s.d.o.f. of the channel.
B. Achievability
The s.d.o.f. for the channel when Nt is not equal to Nr, given in (7), is achieved using
techniques similar to what we presented in Section V. There are few cases, of the number of
antennas, where the achievability is straight forward. One such case is when Nt ≥ Nr + Ne,
where the transmitter can send Nr Gaussian information streams invisible to the eavesdropper,
and the maximum possible s.d.o.f. of the channel, i.e., Nr, is achieved without the help of the
cooperative jammer, i.e., Nc = 0. Another case is when Nr ≥ Nt + min{Nt, Ne}, where the
receiver’s signal space is sufficient for decoding the information and jamming streams, at high
SNR, for all 0 ≤ Nc ≤ Ne, arriving at the s.d.o.f. of Nt (the maximum possible s.d.o.f.) at
Nc = Ne. Thus, there is no constant period in the s.d.o.f. characterization for this case where
the s.d.o.f. keeps increasing by increasing Nc, and Gaussian signaling and cooperative jamming
are sufficient to achieve the s.d.o.f. of the channel.
We consider the five cases of the number of antennas at the different terminals listed in
Section VI-A3. In the following, we summarize the achievable schemes for these cases. Let
d and l denote the number of information and cooperative jamming streams. Pt,Pc are the
precoding matrices at the transmitter and the cooperative jammer.
i) Nt ≥ Nr +Ne
The transmitter sends Nr Gaussian information streams over N(Gt). Ds = Nr is achievable
at Nc = 0.
ii) Nr ≥ Nt ≥ Ne and Nr ≥ Nt +Ne
For 0 ≤ Nc ≤ Ne, d = Nc+Nt−Ne and l = Nc Gaussian streams are transmitted. Choose
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Pt to send Nt − Ne information streams over N(Gt) and align the remaining information
streams over cooperative jamming streams at the eavesdropper. Ds = Nc +Nt −Ne.
iii) Nt ≥ Ne and Nt −Ne < Nr < Nt +Ne:
1) For 0 ≤ Nc ≤ Nr+Ne−Nt2 :
The same scheme as in case (ii) is utilized. Ds = Nc +Nt −Ne.
2) For Nr+Ne−Nt
2
< Nc ≤ Nr and Nr +Nt −Ne is even:
The same scheme as in case (iii-1), with d = Nr+Nt−Ne
2
and l = Nr+Ne−Nt
2
, is utilized.
The cooperative jammer uses only Nr+Ne−Nt
2
of its Nc antennas. Ds = Nr+Nt−Ne2 .
3) For Nr+Ne−Nt
2
< Nc ≤ Nr and Nr +Nt −Ne is odd:
d = Nr+Nt−Ne+1
2
and l = Nr+Ne−Nt+1
2
structured streams, as defined in Section V-C,
are transmitted. The cooperative jammer uses only Nr+Ne−Nt+1
2
of its Nc antennas. Pt
is chosen as in case (ii). The legitimate receiver uses the projection and cancellation
technique, as in Section V-C. Ds = Nr+Nt−Ne2 .
4) For Nr < Nc ≤ 2min{Nt, Nr}+Ne −Nt and Nc +Nt −Ne is even:
d = Nc+Nt−Ne
2
and l = Nc+Ne−Nt
2
Gaussian streams are transmitted. The cooperative
jammer chooses Pc to send Nc − Nr cooperative jamming streams over N(Hc). Pt is
chosen as in case (ii). Ds = Nc+Nt−Ne2 .
5) For Nr < Nc ≤ 2min{Nt, Nr}+Ne −Nt and Nc +Nt −Ne is odd:
d = Nc+Nt−Ne+1
2
and l = Nc+Ne−Nt+1
2
structured streams are transmitted. Pt,Pc are
chosen as in case (iii-4). The legitimate receiver uses the projection and cancellation
technique. Ds = Nc+Nt−Ne2 .
iv) Ne > Nt and Nr ≥ 2Nt
For 0 ≤ Nc ≤ Ne, d = l = [Nc +Nt −Ne]+ Gaussian streams are transmitted. Both Pt,Pc
are chosen to align the information streams over the cooperative jamming streams at the
eavesdropper as in Section V-F. Ds = [Nc +Nt −Ne]+.
v) Ne > Nt and Nr < 2Nt:
1) For 0 ≤ Nc ≤ Nr2 +Ne −Nt:
The same scheme as in case (iv) is utilized. Ds = [Nc +Nt −Ne]+.
2) For Nr
2
+Ne −Nt < Nc ≤ Nr +Ne −Nt and Nr is even:
d = l = Nr
2
Gaussian streams are transmitted. Pt,Pc are chosen as in case (iv). Ds = Nr2 .
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3) For Nr
2
+Ne −Nt < Nc ≤ Nr +Ne −Nt and Nr is odd:
d = l = Nr+1
2
structured streams are transmitted. Pt,Pc are as in case (iv). The legitimate
receiver uses the projection and cancellation technique. Ds = Nr2 .
4) For Nr +Ne −Nt < Nc ≤ 2min{Nt, Nr}+Ne −Nt and Nc +Nt −Ne is even:
d = l = Nc+Nt−Ne
2
Gaussian streams are transmitted. Both Pt,Pc are chosen to align
the information and the cooperative jamming streams at the eavesdropper. Pc is also
chosen to send Nc − Nr cooperative jamming streams over N(Hc) as in Section V-I.
Nc > Nr +Ne −Nt achieves the above two conditions. Ds = Nc+Nt−Ne2 .
5) For Nr +Ne −Nt < Nc ≤ 2min{Nt, Nr}+Ne −Nt and Nc +Nt −Ne is odd:
d = l = Nc+Nt−Ne+1
2
structured streams are transmitted. Pt,Pc are chosen as in case
(v-4). The receiver uses the projection and cancellation technique. Ds = Nc+Nt−Ne2 .
Using the achievable schemes described above for the different cases of the number of
antennas, and their analysis as in Section V, we have (7) as the achievable s.d.o.f., which
completes the proof for theorem 2.
VII. DISCUSSION
At this point, it is useful to discuss the results and the implications of this work. Theorem
1, c.f. (6), shows the behavior of the s.d.o.f., for an (N × N × Ne) multi-antenna Gaussian
wire-tap channel with an Nc-antenna cooperative jammer, associated with increasing Nc form
0 to N +Ne. The s.d.o.f. first increases linearly by increasing Nc from 0 to Ne − ⌈min{N,Ne}2 ⌉,
that is to say adding one antenna at the cooperative jammer provided the system to have one
additional degrees of freedom. The s.d.o.f. remains constant in the Nc range of Ne−⌊min{N,Ne}2 ⌋
to max{N,Ne}, and starts to increase again for Nc from max{N,Ne} to N + Ne, until the
s.d.o.f. arrives at its maximum value, N , at Nc = N +Ne. This behavior transpires both when
the eavesdropper antennas are fewer or more than that of the legitimate receiver.
The reason for the flat s.d.o.f. range is as follows: At high SNR, achieving the secrecy
constraint requires i) the entropy of the cooperative jamming signal, Xnc , to be greater than
or equal to that of the information signal visible to the eavesdropper, and ii) Xnc to completely
cover the information signal, Xnt , at the eavesdropper. For Ne ≤ N , part of Xnt can be sent
invisible to the eavesdropper, and the information signal visible to the eavesdropper can be
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covered by jamming for all Nc. For 0 ≤ Nc ≤ Ne2 , the spatial resources at the receiver are
sufficient, at high SNR, for decoding information and jamming signals which satisfy the above
constraints. Thus, increasing the possible entropy of Xnc by increasing Nc from 0 to
⌊
Ne
2
⌋
allows
for increasing the entropy of Xnt , and hence, the achievable secrecy rate and the s.d.o.f. increase.
At Nc =
⌈
Ne
2
⌉
, the possible entropy of Xnc and, correspondingly, the maximum possible entropy
of Xnt , result in information and jamming signals which completely occupy the receiver’s signal
space. Thus, increasing the possible uncertainty of Xnc by increasing Nc from
⌈
Ne
2
⌉
to N is
useless, since, in this range, Xnc is totally observed by the receiver which has its signal space
already full at Nc =
⌈
Ne
2
⌉
.
Increasing Nc over N increases the possible entropy of Xnc and simultaneously increases the
part of Xnc that can be transmitted invisible to the receiver, leaving more space for Xnt at the
receiver. This allows for increasing the secrecy rate, and hence, the s.d.o.f. starts to increase
again. For Ne > N , the s.d.o.f. is equal to zero for all 0 ≤ Nc ≤ Ne − N , where Xnc can
not cover the information at the eavesdropper for this case. The s.d.o.f. starts to increase again,
after the flat range, at Nc > Ne, since sending jamming signals invisible to the receiver while
satisfying the covering condition at the eavesdropper requires that Nc > Ne.
The difference in the slope for the increase in the s.d.o.f. in the ranges before and after
the flat range, for both Ne ≤ N and Ne > N , can be explained as follows. For 0 ≤ Nc ≤
Ne− min{N,Ne}2 , each additional antenna at the cooperative jammer allows for utilizing two more
spatial dimensions at the receiver; one spatial dimension is used for the jamming signal and
the other is used for the information signal. By contrast, for max{N,Ne} < Nc ≤ N + Ne,
each additional antenna at the cooperative jammer sets one spatial dimension at the receiver free
from jamming, and this spatial dimension is shared between the extra cooperative jamming and
information streams.
It is important to note that the result that suggests that increasing the cooperative jammer
antennas is not useful in the range Ne − min{N,Ne}2 < Nc ≤ max{N,Ne} applies only to the
prelog of the secrecy capacity, i.e., is specific to the high SNR behavior. This should not be
taken to mean that additional antennas do not improve secrecy rate, but only the secrecy rate
scaling with power in the high SNR.
Theorem 2 generalizes the results above to the case where the number of transmit antennas at
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the transmitter, Nt, is not equal to the number of receive antennas at the legitimate receiver, Nr.
Although the maximum possible s.d.o.f. of the channel for this case is limited to min{Nt, Nr} =
Nd, increasing Nt over Nr, or increasing Nr over Nt, do change the behavior of the s.d.o.f.
associated with increasing Nc until the maximum possible s.d.o.f. is reached. Let us start at
Nt = Nr = Nd. For Nt ≥ Ne, increasing Nt over Nd = Nr increases the number of the
information streams that can be sent invisible to the eavesdropper, and hence the s.d.o.f. without
the help of the CJ, i.e., Nc = 0, increases. This results in increasing the range of Nc for which the
s.d.o.f. remains constant by increasing Nc, since the receiver’s signal space gets full at a smaller
Nc and remains full until Nc is larger than Nd = Nr. In addition, increasing Nt over Nd, when
Nt ≥ Ne, results in decreasing the value of Nc at which the maximum s.d.o.f. of the channel,
Nd, is achievable, arriving at Nt ≥ Nr + Ne, where the s.d.o.f. of Nd is achievable without
the help of the CJ. When Ne > Nt, increasing Nt over Nd decreases the value of Nc at which
the s.d.o.f. is positive, and decreases the value of Nc at which the s.d.o.f. of Nd is achievable,
arriving at Nt > Ne, where the channel renders itself to the previous case. For both the cases
Nt ≥ Ne and Nt < Ne, increasing Nr over Nd = Nt, results in increasing the available space at
the receiver’s signal space, and hence the constant period decreases, arriving at Nr ≥ Nt +Ne
when Nt ≥ Ne, or at Nr ≥ 2Nt when Ne > Nt, where the constant period vanishes.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied the multi-antenna wire-tap channel with a Nc-antenna coopera-
tive jammer, Nt-antenna transmitter, Nr-antenna receiver, and Ne-antenna eavesdropper. We have
completely characterized the s.d.o.f. for this channel for all possible values of the number of
antennas at the cooperative jammer, Nc. We have shown that when the s.d.o.f. of the channel is
integer valued, it can be achieved by linear precoding at the transmitter and cooperative jammer,
Gaussian signaling both for transmission and jamming, and linear processing at the legitimate
receiver. By contrast, when the s.d.o.f. is not an integer, we have shown that a scheme which
employs structured signaling both at the transmitter and cooperative jammer, along with joint
signal space and signal scale alignment achieves the s.d.o.f. of the channel. We have seen that,
when Nt ≥ Ne, the transmitter uses its precoder to send a part of its information signal invisible
to the eavesdropper, and to align the remaining part over jamming at the eavesdropper, while the
cooperative jammer uses its precoder to send a part of its jamming signal invisible to the receiver,
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whenever possible. When Ne > Nt, more intricate precoding at the transmitter and cooperative
jammer is required, where both the transmitter and cooperative jammer choose their precoders to
achieve the alignment of information and jamming at the eavesdropper, and simultaneously, the
cooperative jammer designs its precoder, whenever possible, to send a part of the jamming signal
invisible to the receiver. The converse was established by allowing for full cooperation between
the transmitter and cooperative jammer for a certain range of Nc, and by incorporating both
the secrecy and reliability constraints, for the other values of Nc. We note that while this paper
settles the degrees of freedom of this channel, its secrecy capacity is still open. Additionally,
while the model considered here assumes channels to be known, universal secrecy as in [30]
should be considered in the future.
APPENDIX A
CHOICE OF Kt AND Kc
The covariance matrices Kt and Kc are chosen so that they are positive definite, i.e., Kt,Kc ≻
0, and hence non-singular, in order to guarantee the finiteness of h(Z˜t) and h(Z˜c) in (26). In
addition, positive definite Kt and Kc result in positive definite ΣZ˜1 and ΣZ˜2 , and hence, h(Z˜1)
and h(Z˜2) in (28) are also finite.
For INe−GtKtGHt to be a valid covariance matrix for Z˜e in (30),Kt has to satisfyGtKtGHt 
INe , which is equivalent to
||K
1
2
t G
H
t || ≤ 1. (192)
Recall that ||K
1
2
t G
H
t || is the induced norm for the matrix K
1
2
t G
H
t .
Similarly, for IN −HcKcHHc , INe −GtKtGHt −GcKcGHc , and IN −H′c2K′cH′Hc2 to be valid
covariance matrices for Z˜r, Z˜′e, and Z˜′r, in (40), (53), (61), Kt,Kc,K′c have to satisfy
||K
1
2
cH
H
c || ≤ 1, ||K
1
2
t G
H
t ||2 + ||K
1
2
cG
H
c ||2 ≤ 1, and ||K′
1
2
c H
′H
c2
|| ≤ 1. (193)
In order to satisfy the conditions (192) and (193), we choose Kt = ρ2IN , Kc = ρ2IK , where
0 < ρ ≤ 1/max
{
||GHt ||, ||HHc ||,
√
||GHt ||2 + ||GHc ||2, ||H′Hc2 ||
}
(194)
= 1/max
{
||HHc ||,
√
||GHt ||2 + ||GHc ||2
}
. (195)
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APPENDIX B
DERIVATION OF (48), (49), AND (65)
In order to upper bound h(Yr,k(i)), for all i = 1, 2, · · · , n and k = 1, 2, · · · , N , we first upper
bound the variance of Yr,k(i), denoted by Var{Yr,k(i)}. Let hrt,k and hrc,k denote the transpose
of the kth row vectors of Ht and Hc, respectively. Let Zr(i) = [Zr,1(i) · · ·Zr,N(i)]T . Using (1),
Yr,k(i) is expressed as
Yr,k(i) = h
rT
t,kXt(i) + h
rT
c,kXc(i) + Zr,k(i). (196)
Thus, Var{Yr,k(i)} can be bounded as
Var {Yr,k(i)} ≤ E
{
Yr,k(i)Y
∗
r,k(i)
} (197)
= E
{
|hrTt,kXt(i)|2
}
+ E
{
|hrTc,kXc(i)|2
}
+ E
{|Zr,k(i)|2} (198)
≤ ||hrt,k||2 E
{||Xt(i)||2} + ||hrc,k||2 E{||Xc(i)||2}+ 1 (199)
≤ 1 + (||hrt,k||2 + ||hrc,k||2)P, (200)
where (199) follows from Cauchy-Schwarz inequality and monotonicity of expectation, and (200)
follows from the power constraints at the transmitter and cooperative jammer.
Define h2 = max
k
(||hrt,k||2 + ||hrc,k||2). Since h(Yr,k(i)) is upper bounded by the entropy of
a complex Gaussian random variable with the same variance, we have, for all i = 1, 2, · · · , n
and k = 1, 2, · · · , N ,
h(Yr,k(i)) ≤ log 2πe
(
1 +
(||hrt,k||2 + ||hrc,k||2)P ) (201)
≤ log 2πe+ log(1 + h2P ). (202)
Similarly, we have
Y¯r,k(i) = h
rT
t,kXt(i) + h
′rT
c,kX
′
c2
(i) + Zr,k(i), (203)
where h′rc,k is the transpose of the k-th row vector of H′c2 . Thus, we have,
h(Y¯r,k(i)) ≤ log 2πe+ log(1 + h¯2P ), (204)
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where h¯2 = max
k
(||hrt,k||2 + ||h′rc,k||2).
Next, we upper bound h(X˜t,k(i)). The power constraint at the transmitter, for i = 1, 2, · · · , n, is
E
{
XHt (i) Xt(i)
}
=
∑N
k=1 E {|Xt,k(i)|2} ≤ P . Thus, E {|Xt,k(i)|2} ≤ P for all i = 1, 2, · · · , n,
and k = 1, 2, · · · , N . Recall that X˜t,k(i) = Xt,k(i)+ Z˜t,k(i), where Xt,k(i) and Z˜t,k(i) are inde-
pendent, and the covariance matrix of Z˜t isKt = ρ2IN , where 0 < ρ ≤ min
{
1
||HHc || ,
1√
||GHt ||2+||GHc ||2
}
.
Thus, Var{X˜t,k(i)} is upper bounded as
Var{X˜t,k(i)} = Var{Xt,k(i)}+Var{Z˜t,k(i)} (205)
≤ E{|Xt,k(i)|2}+ ρ2 ≤ P + ρ2. (206)
Thus, for i = 1, 2, · · · , n and k = 1, 2, · · · , N , we have
h(X˜t,k(i)) ≤ log 2πe + log(ρ2 + P ). (207)
Similarly, using the power constraint at the cooperative jammer, we have, for i = 1, · · · , n and
j = 1, · · · , K,
h(X˜c,j(i)) ≤ log 2πe+ log(ρ2 + P ). (208)
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Consider two matrices Q ∈ CM×K and W ∈ CK×N such that Q is full row-rank and W
has all of its entries independently drawn from a continuous distribution, where K > N,M . Let
L = min{N,M}. We show that QW has a rank L a.s. . The matrices Q and W can be written
as
Q =
[
q1 q2 · · · qK
]
, (209)
W =
[
w1 w2 · · · wN
]
, (210)
where q1,q2, · · · ,qK are the K length-M column vectors of Q, and w1,w2, · · · ,wN are the
N length-K column vectors of W.
Let wj,i denotes the entry in the jth row and ith column of W. Let QW = [s1 s2 · · · sN ],
where si is a length-M column vector, i = 1, 2, · · · , N . When M ≥ N , QW = [s1 s2 · · · sL],
44
and when M < N , {s1, s2, · · · , sL} are the first L columns of QW. In order to show that
the matrix QW has rank L, we show that, in either case, {s1, s2, · · · , sL} are a.s. linearly
independent, i.e.,
L∑
i=1
λisi = 0M×1 (211)
if and only if λi = 0 for all i = 1, 2, · · · , L.
Each si, for i = 1, 2, · · · , L, can be viewed as a linear combination of the K columns of Q
with coefficients that are the entries of the ith column of W, i.e.,
si =
K∑
j=1
wj,iqj. (212)
Using (212), we can rewrite (211) as
K∑
j=1
ϕjqj = 0M×1 (213)
where, for j = 1, 2, · · · , K,
ϕj =
L∑
i=1
λiwj,i. (214)
The K columns of Q are linearly dependent since each of them is of length M and K > M .
Thus, equation (213) has infinitely many solutions for {ϕj}Kj=1.
Each of these solutions for ϕj’s constitutes a system of K linear equations
{
ϕj =
∑L
i=1 λiwj,i,
j = 1, 2, · · · , K}. The number of unknowns in this system, i.e. λ’s, is L. Since the number
of equations in this system, K, is greater than the number of unknowns, L, this system has
a solution for {λi}Li=1 only if the elements {wj,i : j = 1, 2, · · · , K, and i = 1, 2, · · · , L}
are dependent. Since the entries of W are all randomly and independently drawn from some
continuous distribution, the probability that these entries are dependent is zero.
Moreover, consider the set with infinite cardinality, where each element in this set is a
structured W that causes the system of equations in (214) to have a solution for {λi}Li=1 for
one of the infinitely many solutions of {ϕj}Kj=1 to (213). This set with infinite cardinality has a
measure zero in the space CK×L, since this set is a subspace of CK×L with a dimension strictly
less than K × L. We conclude that (211) a.s. has no non-zero solution for {λi}Li=1. Thus, QW
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has rank L a.s.
If QW has rank L a.s. , then so does (QW)T =WTQT . Setting E1 =WT and E2 = QT , we
have E1 ∈ CN×K has all of its entries independently drawn from some continuous distribution,
E2 ∈ CK×M is full column-rank, K > N,M , and E1E2 has rank L = min{N,M} a.s. Thus,
Lemma 1 is proved.
APPENDIX D
DERIVATION OF (88) AND (89)
The power constraints at the transmitter and cooperative jammer are E{XHt Xt} ≤ P and
E
{
XHc Xc
} ≤ P . Using (71), we have
E
{
XHt Xt
}
= E
{
UHt P
H
t PtUt
} (215)
=
d∑
i=1
d∑
j=1
pHt,jpt,iE
{
U∗j Ui
} (216)
=
d∑
i=1
||pt,i||2E
{|Ui|2} (217)
= ||pt,1||2E
{|U1|2} + d∑
i=2
||pt,i||2
(
E
{
U2i,Re
}
+ E
{
U2i,Im
}) (218)
≤
(
||pt,1||2 + 2
d∑
i=2
||pt,i||2
)
a2Q2, (219)
where (217) follows since Ui and Uj , for i 6= j, are independent, and (219) follows since
E {U21} , E
{
U2i,Re
}
, E
{
U2i,Im
} ≤ a2Q2, for i = 2, 3, · · · , d.
Similarly, using (71) and (86), we have
E
{
XHc Xc
}
= E
{
VHc P
H
c PcVc
}
=
l∑
i=1
E
{|Vi|2} (220)
= E
{
V 21
}
+
l∑
i=2
(
E
{
V 2i,Re
}
+ E
{
V 2i,Im
}) (221)
≤ (2l − 1)a2Q2. (222)
From (219) and (222), in order to satisfy the power constraints, we need that
a2Q2 ≤ γ2P, (223)
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where,
γ2 =
1
max
{
2l − 1, ||pt,1||2 + 2
∑d
i=2 ||pt,i||2
} . (224)
Let us choose the integer Q as
Q =
⌊
P
1−ǫ
2+ǫ
⌋
= P
1−ǫ
2+ǫ − ν, (225)
where ν is a constant which does not depend on the power P . Thus,
a = γP
3ǫ
2(2+ǫ) , (226)
satisfies the condition in (223). Thus, the power constraints at the transmitter and cooperative
jammer are satisfied.
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